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Within scholarship on contemporary Islam, one of
the issues that has generated considerable discus-
sion (and often perplexity) concerns the accuracy or
validity of Muslim historical claims. Many authors
have pointed to a discrepancy between what Muslim
activists today invoke as belonging to the traditions
of Islam and the actual historical record of Islamic so-
cieties. It is argued that historical reality is ignored or
rejected, while a false, distorted, or selective version
of the past is affirmed in its place. In attempting to
characterize and explain this use (or misuse) of histo-
ry, scholars have had recourse to a variety of con-
cepts, some of which merit a re-examination, espe-
cially in light of recent work within historiography. A
brief review of these concepts suggests a need for
new analytical approaches to the styles of historical
argumentation prevalent within Islam today.
Tradition, Myth,
and Historical Fact
in Contemporary Islam
A common current argument is that the
Islam invoked by contemporary activists is
an Ôinvented traditionÕ, in the sense that it
is founded by a sort of historical sleight-of-
hand, positing ancient roots while actually
being of recent origin. In many ways, Hobs-
bawm and Ranger1 provided the re-
spectability of a concept for a phenome-
non that had long been central to the defi-
nition of fundamentalist Islam: namely, the
duplicitous (or in sympathetic accounts,
naive) misrepresentation of history. Addi-
tionally, Benedict AndersonÕs work,2 i n
showing how a similar creative historiogra-
phy undergirded modern nationalism, en-
couraged scholars to interpret Islamist his-
torical claims within the framework of na-
tionalist politics. Accordingly, arguments
for the traditional Islamic status of the
headscarf, democratic political forms, or
the idea of an Islamic state are unmasked
as strategic moves within a modern politics
of cultural authenticity, and thus as not re-
ally Ð historically Ð authentic. One paradox-
ical aspect of this argument, it might be
noted, is that while cultural authenticity is
often criticized as a reactionary form of
modern politics, it is assumed that there is
an a u t h e n t i c relation to the past (not in-
vented, mythological, etc.), and that Is-
lamists are in some sense living falsely not
to acknowledge it and adjust to its de-
m a n d s .
Anthropologies of error
Scholars have also frequently drawn on
the resources of 19t h-century anthropology
in their attempts to grasp the mode of his-
torical reasoning employed by contempo-
rary Muslims. Note, for example, Aziz al-
AzmehÕs use of the notion of the f e t i s h i n
his complaint that Ôtheir [Arab societyÕs] ex-
aggerated attachment to what is past and
what they fetishize as ÒHeritageÓ means
that they are effectively forbidden to per-
ceive reality for what it is or acquire the
means to evolve.Õ3 As developed within
colonial anthropology, fetishism referred
to the false attribution of objective value
by non-Europeans, the sacralization of ob-
jects that European Christians recognized
as actually profane. Al-AzmehÕs reference
to the incapacitating effects of a historical
vision clouded by religious passion testi-
fies to the ongoing impact of this scholarly
t r a d i t i o n .
Colonial anthropology also bequeathed
to students of religion a particular elabora-
tion of the concept of myth, one to which
scholars of Islam have frequently had re-
course. Take, for instance, the following
two well-known authorsÕ suggestions that
Muslims have a ÔmythicalÕ or ÔmysticalÕ rela-
tion to knowledge:
ÔThe historian and the sociologist must
call attention to the anachronism inherent
in [the IslamistsÕ] approach and its nullifica-
tion of the historicity of meaning as subject
to the political, economic, and cultural
metamorphoses of societyÉ The Muslim
cognitive system is essentially mythical.Õ4
ÔIt is in the myth of the complete and Per-
fect Man, and not in the corpus or in Histo-
ry, that one can read the universal, that all
knowledge adds up and that the return to
the golden age Ð the time of the prophet Ð
is foreshadowed. It is with this mystical
conception of knowledge that the new [Is-
lamist] intellectual completes his home-
made construction.Õ5
There is often a slide in such arguments
from the simple charge that Islamists cheat
in representing history to the more compli-
cated claim that they are incapable of
grasping reality. The latter claim resembles
the long-since discarded anthropological
theory, associated primarily with the early
Levy-Bruhl, that primitives were possessed
of a mythical consciousness. This pejora-
tive sense of myth is particularly surprising
in light of the large body of literature ex-
ploring the importance of myth within
modern societies, its foundational role
within our individual psychologies, nation-
al politics, social customs and other areas.
The assertion that Muslim historical
claims involve a kind of mythical reasoning
is frequently coupled with the idea that
such claims ignore or deny Ôreal historyÕ.
Gilles Kepel, for example, notes: ÔWhat dis-
tinguishes the extremist Islamist move-
ment from the bulk of Muslims as far as ref-
erence to the golden age is concerned is
that the former blot out history in favor of
the reactivation of the founding myth,
while the latter accommodate themselves
to the history of Muslim societies.Õ6 T h e
claim being made is not that Muslim ac-
tivists offer no accounts of the past; on the
contrary, they are generally accused of ex-
aggerating its importance. Rather, it is not
history as an account of past events which
Islamists erase, but history understood as
the sole ground of present reality, as the
real (material) conditions of their lives.
Kepel implies that by not Ôaccomodat[ing]
themselvesÕ properly to these conditions,
Islamists take up a false or distorted rela-
tion to their actual historical situation. He
assumes, in other words, that there is a sin-
gle correct relationship to the past: when
Muslims do not acknowledge its dictates, it
is they, and not the analystÕs concept of
history, that are at fault.
Sources and selectivity
Let us look more closely at the issue of
historical accuracy, since it seems to ani-
mate much of the scholarly critique of Is-
lamist arguments. What all of these views
have in common is the assertion that Is-
lamist claims are not supported by histori-
cal facts. But is this claim valid? Historical
facts, in the sense of the documentary or
archaeological remnants that constitute
the historianÕs sources, provide evidence
but are not equivalent to ÔhistoryÕ. Were
this not the case, then the historianÕs task
would be to simply collect and display
these remnants. Historical narratives, how-
ever, are produced by interrogating the
sources, asking particular questions of
them so as to reveal patterns and process-
es more extensive than the sources them-
selves. It is by embedding source materials
within a theoretical construct of history
that a particular kind of historical knowl-
edge is produced. Moreover, it is not the
sources themselves that determine which
construct is to be applied (e.g. economic,
social, theological); that decision precedes
the analysis, and to some degree condi-
tions which sources will be relevant, capa-
ble of providing evidence. As not every his-
torical detail can be presented, this process
always involves a certain selectivity: within
any narrative, certain objects of discourse
are excluded while others are foreground-
ed. Importantly, this selection and arrange-
ment reflects the use to which that narra-
tive is put, the institutional forms (political,
theological, scientific) which that historical
practice upholds, legitimates, and extends.
Historical writing, in other words, is always
shaped by the historianÕs location at a par-
ticular time and place, and by the commit-
ments that he or she holds. It is odd, there-
fore, that we fault Islamist historical narra-
tives for presenting the past from a limited
perspective, as this is a feature of a l l h i s t o r-
ical works.
This does not mean to imply, of course,
that we need to interpret Muslim history
ÔIslamicallyÕ (or theologically, for that mat-
ter), but that to the extent that Muslims do
so, that choice will impact their societies in
ways that (secular) historical work must
take into account. Thus, the goal should
not be to unmask the error of Muslim his-
torical practices from the standpoint of a
set of supposedly universal criteria, but to
ask what their presuppositions, modes of
constructing and arguing from sources,
and methods of verification are, and how
these practices have been transformed
under current conditions in Muslim soci-
eties. This entails greater attention to the
kinds of historical objects which Muslim
historical practices presuppose and the
purposes and projects those practices sus-
t a i n .
To say this is to acknowledge that a tradi-
tion is more than a mere record of facts
which the researcher (with proper academ-
ic training) can scrutinize and re-describe.
As J.L. Austin noted long ago, arguments
about history always entail a performative
aspect: any assessment of their validity
must take into consideration the context of
goals, practices, and assumptions within
which they are embedded.7 For this reason,
we need to recognize that the institutional
goals, standards, and competencies (both
moral and intellectual) involved in Western
academic practice may be distinct in cer-
tain aspects from those undergirding Is-
lamic knowledges. The statements made
by a professor at a Western university, for
example, and those of an ca l i m in Saudi
Arabia are embedded in very different
kinds of social-historical projects. This dif-
ference conditions the kinds of engagement
each will have with Islamic tradition, the
status of their respective claims. Despite
the increasing scope and speed of global
interaction and movement (Ôglobaliza-
tionÕ), such differences in societal and insti-
tutional location remain extremely impor-
tant to contemporary relations of power
and knowledge. This point seems to be in-
sufficiently appreciated by those scholars
who rush to chastise Muslims for unfaith-
fully rendering their own traditions.
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